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3 
Can Tax Expenditures Stimulate 
Growth in Rust Belt Cities?
Benjamin Y. Clark
Cleveland State University
An oft-used arrow in the quiver of those overseeing local and 
regional economic development is the incentivization of tax expen-
ditures (public investment via tax abatements and credits, infra-
structure improvements, and workforce training). Most states and 
communities, including those in the Rust Belt, participate in the 
game to some extent, leading to competition for promised jobs and 
economic activity. Despite the willingness to offer such incentives, 
there is at best scant evidence that these incentives are an effi cient 
use of public funds.
Why do some cities thrive economically and others sputter and 
decline? Are success and failure dependent on luck, or is there some-
thing more profound at play? While there are many ways to address 
these issues, and certainly many contributing factors, this chapter will 
examine one part of the question: Can tax expenditures play a role in 
stimulating the growth of these cities? Consideration of the role of tax 
rates, rather than tax expenditures, is also important but is outside the 
scope of this chapter. Instead, the discussion will focus on how and why 
state and local governments use tax expenditures to attempt to improve 
the conditions of their communities.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that tax expenditure policy is a 
highly inconsistent use of public funds. Local governments are at the 
mercy of a larger macroeconomic environment, over which they have 
little infl uence (Rubin and Rubin 1987). The lack of control leaves 
localities with few tools to create positive change in their communities. 
The device that these governments often turn to is tax expenditures. 
As will be indicated, unfortunately, tax expenditures have been dem-
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onstrated for the most part to play little-to-no role in positive economic 
development. Further, despite this evidence, politicians continue to see 
tax expenditures as one of the most important options available to them. 
Using a case study of an intraregional corporate headquarters move, 
this chapter will investigate how competition among jurisdictions trans-
fers wealth, yet creates few, if any, benefi ts. It then explores how cit-
ies, counties, and other countries are dealing with the competition for 
jobs that leads to tax expenditures and associated movements of wealth. 
Finally, there will be a brief examination of some alternative economic 
development tools that do not result in the large shifts of wealth associ-
ated with tax expenditures.
WHAT ARE TAX EXPENDITURES?
The bundle of tools that state and local government offi cials use 
within the tax code to try to encourage development are called tax 
expenditures; they may also be viewed simply as spending that has been 
initiated through the tax code. Surrey (1970, p. 706) describes them as 
“special provisions . . . which represent government expenditures made 
through [the tax] system to achieve various social and economic objec-
tives.” The state of Ohio’s Executive Budget describes tax expenditures 
in the following way:
Both tax expenditures and direct budgetary expenditures incur a 
cost to the state in order to accomplish public policy goals. Unlike 
direct budgetary expenditures, unless there is a pre-existing ter-
mination date, tax expenditures may remain in effect indefi nitely 
with little or no scrutiny by policy makers. In most states, tax 
expenditures are not analyzed and reviewed as part of the budget 
appropriation process; Ohio is one of the relatively few states that 
do produce a tax expenditure report in conjunction with the state 
budget. It is probably safe to assume that if it were not for this 
report, the fi scal impact of the various Ohio tax expenditure provi-
sions would not be systematically estimated (Testa 2011, p. 1).
Tax expenditures include tax deductions, tax abatements, and tax 
credits. Two examples are the federal mortgage interest deduction and 
hybrid car tax credits. While there is a general belief that the original 
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goal of the mortgage deduction was to encourage homeownership, the 
subsidy came about largely by accident (Lowenstein 2006). Though the 
origin may have been accidental, the inability of opponents in Congress 
to rid the tax code of this tax expenditure could largely be tied to the 
myth that it is the backbone of increasing homeownership. The benefi ts 
generated from the mortgage interest deduction accrue to those that 
own homes, have mortgages, and itemize their tax returns—which ends 
up being about 37 million people, or about half of the individuals who 
own homes (Lowenstein 2006). It does not directly benefi t renters or 
even the lower-income homeowners who do not make enough money 
to itemize their deductions. 
In a less accidental turn of events, the early adopters of the Toyota 
Prius received tax credits the year they purchased the car. The size of 
this hybrid car credit varied from year to year, but it provided a direct 
subsidy, through the tax system, that encouraged the ownership of fuel-
effi cient automobiles. And like spending on roads or other goods and 
services, all tax expenditures are transfers of resources from one group 
to a designated priority; however, in the case of tax expenditures, the 
wealth transfers are manifested in lower tax payments for select groups 
or fi rms.
Tax expenditures are found at all levels of government. State and 
local governments have been using tax expenditures to lure and develop 
businesses since colonial times—in fact, Alexander Hamilton was the 
benefi ciary of a tax expenditure by New Jersey in 1791 to locate a fac-
tory in the state (Buss 2001). Despite the long history of tax expendi-
tures in the United States, it was not until after the end of World War II 
that their use gained signifi cant traction. The changing political moods 
of the 1980s and 1990s further fueled the practice, leading many to see 
tax expenditures as “free money,” by simplifying them as foregone rev-
enues rather than a true expense. 
The fl awed view of tax expenditures is problematic for budgeting 
and makes fi scal policy evaluation exceedingly diffi cult. Some states, 
such as Ohio (where the case study in this chapter takes place), do try 
and estimate the budget impact of tax expenditures. Further, the evi-
dence, even if it may not be precise, presents a story of a big bud-
get hole, $7.4 billion in fi scal year 2012 and $7.8 billion in fi scal year 
2013 of “foregone revenues” or tax expenditures for Ohio (Testa 2011, 
p. 9). Taken together, at more than $15 billion, Ohio would not have 
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had a defi cit to work around for the biannual budget for fi scal years 
2012–2013 and would have actually been in surplus for both years. The 
magnitudes for local governments will clearly be much smaller, but the 
comparative impacts can be just as large.
States often “prefer not to evaluate tax incentive programs in any 
way,” thus avoiding the diffi cult question of their effectiveness (Buss 
2001, p. 93). Rigorous evaluations are often requested when direct 
expenditure subsidies are provided to individuals or businesses (i.e., 
grants, food stamps, welfare checks), but they are frequently not 
required when tax expenditures are being considered (Buss 2001). This 
results in a huge void in our understanding of their impact on the fi s-
cal condition at all levels of government. The state of Ohio report on 
tax expenditures specifi cally states that it “offers no conclusions about 
the validity of those expenditures. The responsibility of evaluating the 
expenditure’s merit with regard to public policy belongs jointly to the 
General Assembly and the Governor” (Testa 2011, p. 1). 
Neither of the preceding parties has offered a comprehensive in-
depth analysis of the effectiveness of these programs. This demon-
strates that, even in a state that has made efforts to actually account for 
and report on the size of the tax expenditure budget, there still remains 
a huge hole in our understanding of how effective these policies are at 
achieving their goals. More broadly, however, tax expenditures decrease 
the transparency of government budgets. Tax expenditures “allow poli-
ticians to appear to be reducing the size of government (reducing taxes) 
while actually increasing it (increasing spending)” (Steuerle 2000, p. 
1639).
At the local level, tax abatements are one of the most common 
types of tax expenditures. Tax abatements are the product of a process 
that is both bureaucratic and political in nature and result in lowering 
the property tax burden on specifi c parcels of land. The political aspect 
of tax abatements demonstrates how they are meant for more than just 
tax relief, to encourage redevelopment of an area or economic growth 
more broadly (Dalehite, Mikesell, and Zorn 2005). Finding a compre-
hensive study of a state’s local tax expenditures is not possible. States 
that allow tax expenditures at the local level have “established the fi scal 
framework under which local governments operate, including determi-
nation of the tax options available to them and the extent to which those 
governments may adopt exceptions to the general structure” (Mikesell 
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2002, p. 41). While some states track major local taxes, “local tax 
expenditures are not detailed to particular local governments” (p. 41). 
What this all means for state and local governments is that they need to 
allocate more resources to investigate the effectiveness of tax expendi-
tures if they are going to use them—something that just is not happen-
ing right now. 
Why Are Tax Expenditures Being Used? Are They Effective?
Poor and rich cities alike have been employing tax expenditures to 
attempt to spur economic development across the country, and not just 
in the Rust Belt. The strategy is used to encourage development and 
attract new jobs, under the assumption that if net taxes (taxes minus all 
tax expenditures) in one city are higher than in its neighbor’s, jobs will 
fl ow to the jurisdiction with the lower net tax rate. 
Unfortunately, this generally accepted and overly simplistic notion 
is not consistent with the evidence. A fi rm’s decision to locate in a com-
munity (leading to an infl ow of jobs to that community) is far more 
complex than making a comparison of taxes across jurisdictions (Chi 
and Hoffmann 2000; Wassmer 2007). The location decision-making 
process falls under a much broader concept of business climate—
although there is signifi cant disagreement over how we can actually 
measure climate—but it typically includes the quality of life, govern-
ment policies, and the quality and cost of resources (Buss 2001). Some 
business climate measures amount to seeking out the state with the low-
est wages, taxes, and utility cost, paired with the weakest regulations, 
the absence of a unionized workforce, and high subsidies for capital 
(p. 98). However, it is clear that if that were the only possible determi-
nant for fi rm location, the states with the nation’s highest tax burdens, 
such as New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, would be without 
employers, and that is clearly not the case. 
What does have a clearer connection to a fi rm’s location decision 
is the linkage between the levels of revenue collected and the services 
provided by a jurisdiction. Consequently, the bundle of features a fi rm 
seeks out, including tax rates and expenditures, involves not just the 
taxes, but the taxes and level of service provided (Buss 2001). As with 
any sort of investment, fi rms seek ones (in this case, in their location) 
that will bring the biggest “bang for their buck,”where most are willing 
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to pay a higher tax rate if the service they are receiving is also higher 
quality or more comprehensive. 
The Impact of Tax Expenditures
Ideally, investments yield positive returns. Similarly, the appropri-
ate use of tax expenditures “should produce economic benefi ts greater 
than [their] costs. An even better [tax expenditure] is one that is cost-
effective, meaning that it delivers more benefi ts for a given cost than 
other similarly targeted initiatives” (Weiner 2009, p. 6). Tax expendi-
tures, particularly those targeted at large fi rms, have failed “to produce 
signifi cant net benefi ts for their host communities, calling into question 
the high-stakes bidding war over jobs and investment” (Fox and Mur-
ray 2004, p. 78). Weiner (2009) shows that “for each dollar of credit 
granted, states usually collect less than one dollar in new tax revenue. 
Thus most credits do not appear to ‘pay for themselves.’ It is therefore 
important to understand the benefi ts states are gaining for the revenues 
they are giving up” (p. 4). 
The discussion of benefi ts foregone is often one that is not had by 
states and local governments. A great deal of effort goes into crafting 
tax expenditure policies, for little or no payoff, while much of what 
affects local/regional economic growth (labor costs, skilled workers, 
energy cost, natural resources, or climate) is beyond the control of these 
governments (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, and Tannenwald 1997). 
When a government entices a large fi rm to move to a particular 
jurisdiction with a host of incentives, including tax expenditures, “the 
location of a large company can crowd out other economic activity by 
shifting sales from existing fi rms, congesting local infrastructure, and 
raising prices in factor markets” (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). A large 
organization locating in an area can create a diminishing return (Fox and 
Murray 2004; Porter 1999). This may come about because a large fi rm 
may choose to locate in an area without other signifi cant competition in 
order to dominate that place and discourage other large companies from 
locating there (Fox and Murray 2004); these businesses may actually be 
hampering further economic development, rather than encouraging it. 
Examples of this can be seen in Mercedes-Benz locating in Tusca-
loosa County, Alabama (where the fi rm claims to be the “state’s larg-
est exporter, with more than $1 billion exported each year to countries 
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throughout the world” [MBUSI 2011]); and BMW in Spartanburg, 
South Carolina (where the company asserts that it is “one of several 
powerful engines driving the state’s growth” [BMW 2011]); and Volk-
swagen in Chattanooga, Tennessee (where the “plant is expected to gen-
erate $12 billion in income growth and an additional 9,500 jobs related 
to the project” [Volkswagen Group of America 2011]); and Kia Motors 
locating in West Point, Georgia (where the “project is the largest in his-
tory for the State of Georgia” [KIA Motors 2011]). 
The incentive packages that these fi rms received were substantial, 
but they were only a small part of the fi rms’ decision-making process. 
Ultimately, the data on fi rm site selection show that “the location of a 
large fi rm has no measurable net economic effect on local economies” 
if it is examined holistically (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). This means 
that the aggressive effort to recruit fi rms “fails to create positive pri-
vate sector gains and likely does not generate signifi cant public revenue 
gains either” (p. 79). This can be interpreted to mean that the siting of 
a fi rm, often lauded as a major “win” by state and local development 
agents, may not actually have the great effect promised. Because “there 
is little evidence of positive or negative growth impacts associated with 
the location of large fi rms,” local governments should instead try to 
make more cost-effective economic strategic moves (p. 91).
The big “win,” as seen in high-profi le “mega-events” like the Super 
Bowl and Olympics, which cities constantly fi ght over, also provides 
very little help in spurring economic development. Activities like the 
Super Bowl or Olympics “have no real effects on spending in host com-
munities,” a result that can in part be blamed on the “crowding-out phe-
nomenon,” where long-term economic activity and investments lose 
out to short-term jobs (Fox and Murray 2004, p. 79). 
Distributional Issues 
The intent of many property tax abatements is to draw employers to 
an area that might have otherwise been ignored; this can help to create 
conditions that improve economic equality. When the tax expenditures 
are constrained only to high-poverty and high-unemployment areas, 
research suggests that tax expenditures can provide a disproportionate 
benefi t to minorities and low-income individuals (Bartik 2007; Peters 
and Fisher 2004; Wassmer 2007; Wassmer and Anderson 2001). 
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However, most applications of economic-development-oriented tax 
expenditures create an environment of inequality (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, 
and Tannenwald 1997; Chi and Hoffmann 2000; Goss and Phillips 
1999; Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras 2010; Kocieniewski 2011; Reese 
1991; Reese and Sands 2006; Wassmer 2007). Tax expenditure policies 
tend to exacerbate inequality across a region, rather than abate it. The 
wealthy jurisdictions can afford tax expenditures that the poor ones can-
not, which can lead to the rich getting richer (more jobs and economic 
development) and the poor jurisdictions getting poorer (Dewar 1998; 
Goss and Phillips 1999; Reese 1991; Reese and Sands 2006). This is 
not to say that poor cities are not using tax expenditures, but that these 
expenditures often put additional stress on communities in an already 
diffi cult fi nancial position (Rubin and Rubin 1987). For rich and poor 
cities alike, these incentives rarely provide the benefi t they promise, 
and those benefi ts they do provide rarely exceed the costs (Reese and 
Sands 2006; Wassmer and Anderson 2001). 
Moreover, the benefi ts associated with tax expenditures tend not to 
accumulate where policymakers state they are supposed to accummu-
late (which is often in economically distressed areas). Goss and Phillips 
(2001), for example, fi nd that “business tax incentives have had a posi-
tive effect on economic growth in low-unemployment counties, but not 
in high-unemployment counties” (p. 237) and “tended to be undertaken 
in areas with historically higher investment activity, thus contributing to 
greater economic performance differences among counties in the state” 
(p. 217). Tax expenditures have often been “criticized because they are 
only effective at the margins in business location decisions” (Reese and 
Sands 2006, p. 72). Negative relationships have been found between 
some types of tax expenditures and the improvement of a jurisdiction’s 
economic health spanning a 20-year period. While this does not mean 
that in all instances tax expenditures will have a negative impact on a 
jurisdiction, the research indicates that by not using tax expenditures 
jurisdictions are not hindering their growth (Reese and Sands 2006).
Tax expenditures may foster inequality by favoring one industry 
over another. A great number of tax expenditures concentrate exclu-
sively on manufacturing, but in the process end up ignoring other 
important sectors such as business services, health care, and fi nance 
(Buss 2001). 
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At the federal level, the corporate tax system can rightly be con-
sidered both uneven and highly complex (Kocieniewski 2011), in large 
part because of tax expenditures that benefi t individual fi rms or spe-
cifi c industries. The inequity can spread to an intra-industry inequal-
ity, where two companies in the same industry, producing very similar 
products, have different tax rates. This is often a result of the larger fi rm 
having more power and wealth, allowing it to have its effective rates 
reduced through new tax expenditures. At the federal level, tax expen-
ditures that “intentionally benefi t specifi c companies or industries, cost 
an estimated $100 billion more a year” (Kocieniewski 2011). However, 
Greenbaum, Russell, and Petras (2010) show that when controlling for 
the location of tax expenditures, neither distressed areas nor specifi c 
industries were seen to benefi t, and that instead tax expenditures (or 
incentives) were distributed in a pattern that “largely refl ects the local 
industrial mix” (p. 155). This same study did fi nd disparities between 
urban and rural areas, where the benefi ts of tax expenditures accrued at 
higher rates to rural than to urban locales. 
Many who support interjurisdictional competition claim that it 
reduces taxes for all competing jurisdictions. This assertion, however, 
is only valid when jurisdictions “are similarly endowed with taxable 
resources and face similar fi scal challenges” (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, 
and Tannenwald 1997, p. 12). Reality tells us that jurisdictions within 
a region are rarely in the same resource/fi scal position, because some 
“jurisdictions are continual winners and others perpetual losers in the 
competitive process, especially in the absence of equalizing aid from a 
higher level of government” (p. 12). 
To make matters worse, most states do not have any written guide-
lines for determining how and when tax expenditures to business are 
offered (Chi and Hofmann 2000). This can result in inequality in the 
distribution of tax expenditures and make evaluation of the programs 
very diffi cult. Iowa, seeing some of the problems in Minnesota, where 
“tax incentives tend to be focused on those areas already primed to do 
well,” limited its tax expenditure program to “business investment in 
areas of the state lagging in economic performance” (Goss and Phillips 
1999, p. 226). Focusing on a particular socioeconomic group does not 
necessarily mean that the tax expenditures will provide a greater benefi t 
than cost, but, in terms of creating policy aimed at alleviating inequal-
ity, Iowa at least targets communities in greatest need.
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Information and Competition
If tax expenditures are only effective at the margins, as Reese and 
Sands (2006) indicate, a signifi cant information asymmetry problem 
arises for local jurisdictions. They are faced with a task of determining 
which of those employers seeking the tax expenditures are the marginal 
cases and which are just seeking additional rents (or profi t seeking) for 
a decision they have already made. Unfortunately, these governments 
have no good way to determine which cases are marginal and which are 
not. Traditionally, the outcome of negotiations between a fi rm seeking a 
tax expenditure and a local government depends on the relative power 
of the respective sides (Byrnes, Marvel, and Sridhar 1999). If a jurisdic-
tion has little to lose if the fi rm leaves, it can certainly try and call the 
fi rm’s bluff, wait it out, and hope for the best. 
In Ohio, as the ability to offer tax abatements extends to more juris-
dictions, the competition among these areas leads to larger abatements 
(Cassell and Turner 2010). From 1993 to 2009, nearly half of the 2,059 
tax expenditures in Ohio that were approved by the state Tax Credit 
Authority “were terminated or canceled before completion” (Lieb 
2011). The failure rate to which the state of Ohio is admitting is simply 
pointing out that these projects were terminated or cancelled, not that 
they were actually successful in creating the jobs or economic gains that 
they set out to attain. The current year projection puts tax expenditures 
approved in one year for eight northeast Ohio (the area that includes 
Cleveland/Akron/Canton) projects at $49.5 million over a period of 15 
years (Schoenberger 2011). This results in large sums of money being 
promised for projects over the long term, which come with very high 
incompletion rates. 
While these risky moves may be good for fi rms, the evidence that tax 
expenditures provide a net benefi t is not very strong. Interjurisdictional 
competition is a zero-sum game, in which companies pit neighboring 
cities against one another for the best deal, and can hardly be described 
as good for development across jurisdictions. The consequences are the 
“job gains” for one city and “job losses” for its neighbor, a strategy 
that does not provide net benefi ts to the region. And, in many cases, 
the businesses have no intention of moving but just want to get a bet-
ter tax expenditure deal in their current location (Lynch, Fishgold, and 
Blackwood 1996). Wohlgemuth and Kilkenny (1998) note that “acqui-
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escing to the rent-seeking behavior of fi rms leads to socially suboptimal 
outcomes” (p. 140). The best case tax expenditures scenario, say Peters 
and Fisher (2004), “is that incentives work about 10 percent of the time, 
and are simply a waste of money the other 90 percent” (p. 32). 
IF TAX EXPENDITURES ARE A LARGELY INEFFECTIVE 
TOOL, WHY ARE THEY USED SO FREQUENTLY?
If tax expenditures aimed at economic development have at best a 
10 percent success rate, and are a waste of money the other 90 percent 
of the time, why do governments continue to use them? The reason 
appears to be political, rather than their economic value. Although noth-
ing is inherently wrong with a strategy based on politics, tax expendi-
tures programs are frequently sold to the public based on their effective-
ness. It is time that politicians acknowledge that these are frequently 
political actions, not economic ones.
One reason tax expenditures are used so commonly is that poli-
ticians frequently do not view them as actual outlays of government 
revenues. The fi ght over what constitutes a tax expenditure and what 
constitutes a tax can pit long-time ideological allies against each other. 
For instance, in 2011, there was a battle over eliminating ethanol tax 
expenditures, which, coincidentally, were commonly referred to as sub-
sidies in the media. Grover Norquist, iconic antitax champion and head 
of the group Americans for Tax Reform, was pitted against Senator Tom 
Coburn, an antitax conservative from Oklahoma, who was himself a 
signatory to Norquist’s famous antitax pledge. Norquist claimed that 
the elimination of ethanol tax expenditures was an increase in taxes for 
farmers and producers. In his view, a tax expenditure was not an expen-
diture at all but a part of the tax rate, so that any attempt to eliminate a 
tax expenditure was actually a tax increase. On the other hand, Senator 
Coburn rightly saw tax expenditures for what they are: spending. As 
a result, two natural allies publicly opposed one another because they 
could not agree on what constitutes an expenditure. This is problematic 
for the government’s ability to manage its fi nances and budget.
While two self-defi ned fi scal conservatives have fought over what 
is and is not a tax expenditure, the broader political marketplace is even 
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murkier. Beyond the debate over the defi nition of tax expenditures, our 
political climate in recent decades has made new expenditures very dif-
fi cult to justify. This has led to expenditures masquerading as tax cuts, 
and policymakers pushing for tax expenditures because they are more 
politically palatable than additional spending.
Job and industry mobility within the United States and internation-
ally, or at least the perception of that mobility, increases the pressure to 
do something (Wolman and Spitzley 1996). However, it appears that 
the fear of relocation is not necessarily based on verifi able reality. Lee 
(2008) fi nds “a relatively small role for relocation in explaining the 
disparity of manufacturing employment growth rates across states” (p. 
436). Also, fi rms moving from one jurisdiction to another, while not 
uncommon, cannot be explained by the incentive programs trying to 
keep or pull them to or from a jurisdiction. In some situations, these 
incentive programs are even positively correlated with a loss of jobs 
or shuttering of factories. This may just indicate that state and local 
governments are acting too late to keep fi rms that are moving jobs, but 
it may also show that tax expenditures simply are not what drives the 
decision to locate or relocate. A number of tax expenditures, particu-
larly those for capital purchases, actually have a negative impact on 
employment because they are making the machinery and equipment 
that replace laborers cheaper, resulting in layoffs (Lee 2008).
Cutbacks in state and federal intergovernmental aid are putting bur-
dens on local governments to do more with less (Wassmer 2007). At 
the heart of the $1.4 billion budget impasse that shut down the state 
of Minnesota in July 2011 was more than $400 million in cuts to local 
governments (Dunbar 2011). Ohio’s 2011–2013 biennial budget cut 
its support to local governments by nearly half a billion dollars (Mar-
shall 2011). The challenges that many local governments face are not 
just found in shrinking intergovernmental aid, but also in the ways and 
amounts of money that can be raised. Here again politics is a primary 
agent. State lawmakers are compelled to do something, which often 
results in the institution of property tax restrictions that further hin-
der the ability of local governments to raise money. These cutbacks 
and restrictions cause local governments to seek out alternative ways to 
redevelop their economic situation. The result has often been the use of 
tax expenditures policy, “not because it was effective but because it was 
a remarkably easy path to follow, one that allowed [politicians] to claim 
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they were mounting a serious attack on the economic problems of the 
city” (Swanstrom 1985, p. 149). The tax expenditures allow politicians 
“to take a bow for causing some massive private project” or “point to 
towering skyscrapers downtown and say, ‘without my help these never 
would have come about’” (pp. 149–150). 
Often it appears as though “the solutions not only precede the 
problems, they may supersede them and provide their own motiva-
tion” (Rubin and Rubin 1987, p. 57). As a consequence, short-sighted 
public offi cials trying to maximize reelection probabilities “may offer 
more incentives than required. That is, the closer the negotiation with 
business is to an election, the less chance the government offi cial will 
take in ‘losing’ the business, and the more likely the incentive package 
will be larger” (Byrnes, Marvel, and Sridhar 1999, p. 809). To counter-
act these self-serving political aspirations, adding citizen involvement 
could be benefi cial in tax expenditure negotiations with fi rms.
Another element of the political calculation is the number of jobs 
the projects supported by tax expenditures will create. Both politi-
cians and fi rms have a motivation to overestimate job numbers to jus-
tify spending. Gabe and Kraybill (2002) fi nd that tax expenditure pro-
grams result in fi rms on average overestimating the number of jobs the 
tax incentives will create by 28.5 jobs with each facility’s expansion. 
Their results “suggest that [tax expenditure] incentives do not result 
in the creation of more jobs than would have been created without the 
programs” (p. 724). Again, politicians are willing enablers of these 
approaches because they want to be seen doing “something” and want 
to be able to take credit for benefi ts—if any materialize. Voters are left 
without suffi cient information to do post hoc evaluations of these pro-
grams, uncertain if the jobs were created as a result of the tax credits 
or not. The lack of an analysis of the promises made by the companies 
creates an incentive for these organizations to overestimate the benefi ts 
and to garner larger tax credits. 
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THE CASE OF BROOKLYN, OHIO, AND 
AMERICAN GREETINGS
The case of American Greetings (AG), the largest publicly traded 
greeting card company in the United States, provides a real-world 
example of the implementation of tax expenditures at the state and local 
levels in an attempt to keep or lure a fi rm. The predicament of Brooklyn, 
Ohio, a Cleveland suburb and site of AG’s corporate headquarters, is all 
too familiar. In May of 2009, Brooklyn faced the challenge of choosing 
between drastic cutbacks to services and a tax increase in order to bal-
ance its budget. The citizens of Brooklyn voted, albeit narrowly, to raise 
the local income tax rate from 2.0 to 2.5 percent (Noga 2009). Between 
the time that this tax levy was put onto the ballot and the time that vot-
ers approved the measure, employers Key Bank, Hugo Boss, and AG 
all announced layoffs from their local facilities. In response, the city’s 
leaders pledged that they would reduce the property tax millage from 
6.9 to 5.9 if the income tax rate were increased, as it eventually was 
(Noga 2009). The total property tax rate for a Brooklyn property owner 
would be 75.9 mills for those without exemptions, and considerably 
lower for those who qualifi ed for exemptions. 
What transpired after the voters of Brooklyn approved the tax 
increase is a story that many cities face every year: AG threatened to 
move its headquarters out of the city because of the tax increase. The 
company stated that although it understood Brooklyn’s predicament, it 
was “disappointed” in the action taken by the city (Cho 2010). AG then 
began a search for a new headquarters to locations not just in northeast 
Ohio, but throughout the nation. In return, Brooklyn promised to lower 
its income tax rate back to the 2 percent level at which it had been prior 
to the voter-approved increase, with some in the government pushing 
for it to be reduced to 1.5 percent. The challenge for Brooklyn Mayor 
Richard Balbier was that “you just can’t take the taxpayers’ money and 
give it to a company” (Cho 2011b). 
By November 2010, AG had narrowed its new headquarters search 
to 15 Ohio sites, most of which were still in the Cleveland area, and 
to one in Chicago. Brooklyn prepared a tax expenditure package that 
would be worth $6.5–$10 million over 15 years (Cho 2011b). The state 
of Ohio got involved by passing a special tax credit for AG to remain 
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in Ohio, signed ceremonially at the AG headquarters by Governor John 
Kasich. In total, the state package prepared to encourage AG to stay in 
Ohio equaled $93.5 million over 15 years (Cho 2011a). Days after this 
tax expenditure package was signed into law, AG announced that it was 
staying in Ohio. 
A few weeks later, on May 20, 2011, AG announced that it was 
moving its headquarters to Westlake, another Cleveland suburb. Coin-
cidentally or not, the new headquarters location is part of a larger devel-
opment that is owned in part by members of the Weiss family, which 
leads AG (McFee 2011).
The move of AG’s headquarters from Brooklyn to Westlake will 
be a devastating blow to its former home, as 13 percent of that city’s 
revenues, or about $3 million, are generated from AG. Westlake may 
have won out over Brooklyn in part because of a lower tax rate (1.5 
percent rather than Brooklyn’s 2.5 percent), but company offi cials did 
make it clear that the decision was much larger than taxes. AG wanted 
“an environment that more accurately refl ects and effectively supports 
our creative and innovative culture” (Cho 2011a). The fi rm also had an 
aging headquarters that needed to be replaced. If one considers total 
tax burdens, and not just the income tax, as is often the case, Westlake 
actually has a substantially higher property tax millage of 9.6. The total 
property tax burden for city residents is 100.9 mills, which includes 
city, library, schools, and county taxes (City of Westlake 2011a).
IF TAXES WERE NOT THE IMPETUS FOR AG LEAVING 
BROOKLYN, THEN WHAT COULD IT BE?
During the search for a new headquarters, executives of AG consis-
tently stated that “they sought a location that would allow it to recruit 
and retain talent in an atmosphere fostering creativity” (Bullard 2011). 
The fi rm’s chief executive offi cer stated that the new location, Crocker 
Park in Westlake, would provide AG with a “lifestyle center that will 
be attractive to our current and future associates. You will be able to 
shop, dine, and fi nd a variety of leisure activities nearby. It is easily 
accessible from several local freeways. The amenities and environment 
at Crocker Park will give our associates in every department a place to 
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fl ourish, and maximize their performance, innovation and creativity” 
(Bullard 2011). 
The benefi ts of having more perks and services nearby have been 
mastered by Silicon Valley fi rms like Google, which have barbers, day 
care, dining, laundry, and recreation facilities. These perks for employ-
ees “have the added bonus of keeping the employee workforce in the 
offi ce more often. Give employees enough reasons to stick around and 
you’ll likely see productivity go up. Why head home when everything 
you need is at work?” (Strickland 2008). By moving to Crocker Park 
in Westlake, AG will have access to far more services that could poten-
tially entice its workers to stay around the offi ce longer and that perhaps 
could lead to higher productivity. This is clearly a benefi t for AG that 
has nothing to do with tax expenditure policy.
By further comparing Brooklyn’s and Westlake’s infrastructures 
and fi nances, a clearer picture of AG regarding the move will start to 
surface. This is not to say that any one of these factors provides the 
answer as to why AG moved, but together they do create a picture of the 
differences between these two locations.
First and foremost, Westlake is a wealthier community than Brook-
lyn. This can be measured with two simple metrics: median household 
income and median value of homes. In 2010, the median home value in 
Westlake was about 89 percent higher than in Brooklyn, $234,000 and 
$124,100, respectively (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). Westlake’s median
household income in 2010 was 67 percent higher than Brooklyn’s 
($68,091 and $40,661, respectively). Westlake has fared substantially 
better during the housing bust that started across the country in 2008. 
Brooklyn saw the average sales price of homes drop by 24.33 percent 
between 2005 and 2010, while Westlake saw only a 12.12 percent 
decline. The 10-year change in prices for the two cities also shows a 
disparity: Brooklyn’s average change from 2001 to 2010 was a decline 
of 8.02 percent, while Westlake saw a modest 0.56 percent increase 
(Cleveland Magazine 2011). 
The disparities between Brooklyn and Westlake can be further 
examined by looking at the cumulative assessed value of both cities. 
Since the population sizes of the cities differ substantially, Figure 3.1 
controls for assessed value based on population. What is demonstrated 
in this chart is that Westlake’s assessed value per capita consistently 
hovers around a value that is about three times as large as Brooklyn’s.
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Next, Brooklyn also has 1.6 times as many people living below the 
poverty line as Westlake (6.6 percent below poverty for Brooklyn and 
2.5 percent for Westlake). Why might a wealthier city attract AG? It 
may be that AG wants to project an image of prosperity to its employ-
ees, and clearly Westlake has a substantial advantage according to those 
two measures of community wealth. 
Third, there are substantial and measurable differences in the per-
formance of the two cities’ education systems. Each year Ohio rates all 
of its school districts. In 2011 it rated Brooklyn’s schools as “effective,” 
while Westlake’s were rated as “excellent.” Each school district was 
additionally given performance ratings (ranging from 0 to 120); West-
lake received a score of 107.2 and met adequate yearly progress (Ohio 
Department of Education 2011). While Brooklyn’s performance rating 
score was 96.8, the district did not meet adequate yearly progress. Addi-
tional information comes from Cleveland Magazine’s annual “Rating 
the Suburbs” issue. While rating systems in a magazine are bound to 
come with some controversy, they are still read by people in the com-
munity and by those planning to move to the area. Here again we see 
Westlake with substantially higher scores in education, receiving a rank 
Figure 3.1  Assessed Value per Capita, Brooklyn and Westlake, Ohio 
(2011$)
SOURCE: Assessed valuation data come from the cities’ Comprehensive Annual 
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of 10 out of more than 200 communities in the Cleveland metro area, as 
compared to Brooklyn, with a rank of 46 (Cleveland Magazine 2011). 
Fourth, Westlake outperforms Brooklyn on a broad range of other 
“lifestyle” ratings. Westlake is perceived to be a safer community than 
Brooklyn. Again drawing from the Cleveland Magazine (2011) pro-
fi les, Westlake received a rank of 20 (lower being better) and Brooklyn 
received a rank of 73. These scores are based upon a variety of crime 
statistics for all metro Cleveland jurisdictions. Westlake’s “total com-
munity services” rating is 13, while Brooklyn’s is 15. 
Finally, the fi nancial stability of the two cities is quite different. 
One very broad indicator of fi nancial condition is bond ratings. Brook-
lyn’s bond rating, in September 2011, by Moody’s (2011), was Aa2. 
Westlake’s rating by Moody’s, from December of 2011, was Aaa. While 
both cities’ credit ratings are excellent, Westlake’s rating is as high as a 
rating can be, considered a prime rating, while Brooklyn’s rating is two 
notches lower. Westlake is unique in the entire state for being “the fi rst 
suburb in Ohio to have been awarded all of the Aaa/AAA ratings” (City 
of Westlake 2011b). 
We can also look at fi nancial stability in terms of budget balances. 
The fund balances of both cities are exceptional. Both carry fund bal-
ances well in excess of the best practice recommendations of the Gov-
ernment Finance Offi cers Association (2009). This is particularly rele-
vant in recent years of stagnating revenues (the Great Recession), where 
both cities have been very capable of providing a cushion from which to 
draw down excess funds without raising taxes or cutting services.
What can we tell from looking at the perceptions of infrastructure, 
safety, and fi nancial stability? The case demonstrates clearly that taxes 
were not the main issue in AG’s deliberations. Table 3.1 summarizes 
the potential deciding factors in AG’s move from Brooklyn to Westlake. 
On all nontax elements, Westlake has a clear advantage over Brooklyn. 
If taxes were the main driver, then AG would have stayed in Brooklyn 
because the city offered to lower its income tax rate to one comparable 
to Westlake’s, in addition to a tax expenditure package worth up to $10 
million and lower property tax rates. The case further demonstrates a 
reality for many cities; they are at a great disadvantage relative to fi rms, 
particularly large companies. If a major employer wants a new facility, 
perhaps even one that it has been planning for years, it can leverage the 
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system to reap, at times, huge sums of money to do something it was 
already going to do, with or without the funds. 
In the case of AG, a triggering event (a one-half percentage point 
income tax increase in Brooklyn) gave the company a strong negotiat-
ing position. Without access to AG’s internal communications, there is 
no way of knowing if the fi rm truly wanted to leave the area prior to this 
circumstance. What can be seen is a company seizing the opportunity 
to extract rents from different jurisdictions by threatening to leave the 
city, county, and state.
One can question the actions of the state in the Brooklyn-AG 
case. Was the rush to keep AG in Ohio actually what killed Brooklyn’s 
chance at keeping AG? The deal (nearly $100 million) provided by the 
state of Ohio may have kept AG in Ohio, but for the state it did not mat-
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ter where AG was located, as long as it was within the state. This creates 
an environment for the rich to get richer: the company got nearly $100 
million and the city of Westlake got a new large employer at apparently 
little direct cost themselves. This also provides an environment for the 
poor to get poorer: the state of Ohio’s revenues dropped by nearly $100 
million at a time when Governor Kasich was trying to fi ll an $8 billion 
budget defi cit, and Brooklyn, a poorer Cleveland suburb, lost its largest 
employer, creating a big hole for it to dig out of. As stated by Cuyahoga 
County Executive Edward FitzGerald, with AG leaving Brooklyn, 
“You will have a community that will be the big loser [Brooklyn], and 
the state will have paid for that” (Niquette 2011).
The case of AG echoes the fi nding in the literature that the decision 
to move is not simple and pits neighboring cities and states against one 
another, to the direct advantage of the fi rm. AG’s actions are rational, 
based on its operating environment, and the company cannot be faulted 
for how it handled the situation. This case is not meant to be a critique 
of AG, but rather a critique of the political ecosystem within which it 
operates.
A WAY FORWARD
AG’s move within Cuyahoga County from Brooklyn to Westlake is 
having a signifi cant local political impact. This case is an example of 
a kind of interjurisdictional competition that is seen across the United 
States. Clearly the move will be devastating to Brooklyn, and while 
it may not be a net loss for the county, it again feeds more inequality 
into the jurisdiction in this zero-sum game. This is leading Cuyahoga 
County and other places nationwide to start thinking less about compe-
tition and more about cooperation. 
Cooperation among Jurisdictions
One step Cuyahoga County took in the Brooklyn-AG situation was 
to not provide any incentives to AG. Cuyahoga County did not “want 
to give them any incentive to move from one city in Cuyahoga County 
to another,” especially in this case with, as Cuyahoga County Executive 
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FitzGerald notes, “wealthier suburb[s] that can afford more grants and 
tax incentives” (Cho 2011a). In an effort to stem the tide of cities within 
Cuyahoga County fi ghting with each other to land the next big head-
quarters, FitzGerald is trying to leverage his economic development 
budget by offering incentives to cities signing on to an antipoaching 
pact. Communities that commit to this will get revenue sharing and a 
piece of the county’s $100 million economic development fund (John-
ston 2011). 
The fi ght for jobs through tax expenditures among U.S. jurisdic-
tions is also going on elsewhere in the world. In 2003 all but one of 
Australia’s states and territories “signed an historic pact to end inter-
state bidding wars for business investment and major events” (State of 
Victoria 2003). The pact, which was renewed in 2006 (State of Victoria 
2006) and set for another renewal vote in 2011, came about as a result 
of a bidding war for a A$430 million News Corporation/Fox movie 
studio. Similar to the approach being taken by FitzGerald in Cuyahoga 
County, the Australian pact “includes protocols to avoid offering fi nan-
cial and other investment incentives to companies relocating from else-
where in Australia—a situation where there is no national economic 
benefi t.” Australian subnational offi cials have found the pact to be very 
valuable in reducing the fi rms’ rent extractions, because the businesses 
try to overstate “the incentives offered by the potential ‘rival’ location” 
(State of Victoria 2003). 
One of the keys to the Australian and Cuyahoga County programs is 
the explicit goal of sharing information among governments. By doing 
so, these programs reduce the information asymmetry that exists when 
fi rms attempt to play one jurisdiction against another. At heart, the chal-
lenge for these potentially rival jurisdictions is a prisoner’s dilemma, 
in which cooperation will yield a better outcome for both government 
parties, but with informational barriers present, one or both of the juris-
dictions will tend to defect, resulting in a race to the bottom (Oates 
1972, 1999). 
The race to the bottom creates a fear in community offi cials of 
“losing local business and jobs [which] thus leads to suboptimal levels 
of state and local public goods” (Oates 1999, p. 1135). Alice Rivlin 
(1992), the fi rst to head the Congressional Budget Offi ce and a recent 
member of the Obama Administration’s Debt Commission, sees the 
competition between neighboring jurisdictions as a fi ght that produces 
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inadequate levels of public service delivery because the competition 
drives revenues too low. She has proposed a revenue-sharing scheme 
that would alleviate some of jurisdictions’ worries about losing busi-
ness (Rivlin 1992). 
While Cuyahoga County strives to create a system in which its 
cities share information, the state of Ohio appears to be going in the 
opposite direction. It has privatized its development activities, which 
constrains access to information and citizen involvement. The limits 
that Ohio Governor Kasich seeks are thought by some people to be an 
economic advantage for the state, as it competes with its neighbors for 
companies. Site brokers, the agents working for fi rms trying to relocate, 
counsel governments to keep all bids secret. These consultants essen-
tially threaten to blackball states and site brokers if they do not comply 
with the secrecy pacts (Markusen and Nesse 2007, p. 22). The fi rms 
benefi t from having information asymmetry on their side, which keeps 
the fear of losing a deal alive by leaving cities and states in the dark. But 
it is obvious that cities and states may not be going in the same direction 
on this issue. 
Jurisdictions are left in a quandary: they want to improve their fi s-
cal and economic situations without being taken advantage of by fi rms 
or decimating neighboring jurisdictions. Rivlin (1992) suggests that
States might provide higher-quality services if they shared some 
taxes and did not have to worry so much about losing businesses 
to neighboring states with lower tax rates. They would then have 
more incentives to compete on the basis of excellence of their ser-
vices. They would have to attract businesses and residents with 
good schools, parks and transportation, rather than with tax breaks. 
The common taxes would also simplify the tax structure and lower 
the compliance costs facing companies that operate in many states, 
as well as reducing the enforcement costs of the tax collectors. 
(p. 142)
The Importance of Evaluating Results
We know that tax expenditures will continue to be used. It is also 
clear that under certain circumstances tax expenditures can be margin-
ally effective policy tools, but only if the jurisdictions employing them 
take the time to analyze their use. Unfortunately, research suggests 
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that “few municipalities place conditions on [tax expenditures], most 
never evaluate the performance of fi rms . . . and abatement requests 
are seldom or never rejected” (Sands, Reese, and Khan 2006, p. 44). 
When data are collected, the information is often not appropriate to help 
in evaluation of programs, nor is it timely (Buss 2001). One-third of 
governments place few, if any, conditions on who gets tax expenditure 
benefi ts, and 88 percent of governments reject virtually no one (Sands, 
Reese, and Khan 2006). Because most jurisdictions do not bother to 
evaluate the outcomes of tax expenditures, it is little wonder that this 
tool is so ineffective. The shotgun approach clearly is not working; tar-
geting tax expenditures to distressed areas and evaluating the programs 
could turn tax expenditures from a 10 percent to a 90 percent success 
rate (Peters and Fisher 2004).
Further thought needs to be put into what types of fi rms are getting 
the benefi ts as well. Does the tax expenditure create negative externali-
ties for a community (sweatshop work environments or major environ-
mental burdens)? If so, does this really help to develop the community? 
Clear goals for development are necessary, rather than a mechanism “to 
provide political cover for the decision to grant an abatement” (Sands, 
Reese, and Khan 2006, p. 53); not rejecting any fi rm’s applications 
for tax expenditures provides just such a situation. However, in most 
programs the evidence of targeting simply does not exist (Greenbaum, 
Russell, and Petras 2010). 
In addition to a lack of actual evaluation of the tax expenditure poli-
cies, there is also some diffi culty in defi ning the problem that is being 
addressed. How is growth defi ned? Is it growth of GDP, or employ-
ment, or some other factor? Why a company decides to move its head-
quarters to the Rust Belt, or out of it, is not a simple question. Trying to 
model this decision-making process is even more diffi cult. For exam-
ple, Phillips and Goss (1995) note that “studies that use investment or 
income growth as the dependent variable fi nd that taxes have a larger 
infl uence on growth than do studies using aggregate employment or 
individual fi rm data” (p. 325). Both income growth and employment 
would presumably measure the economic health of a region, but if they 
are leading to contrary conclusions, then modeling this question will be 
problematic, at best.  
Decisions made in the past can haunt a city for years, even when 
the conditions are not the same today (see Box 2.1). If a large part of 
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Box 2.1  Minicase of Atlanta, Georgia
Atlanta’s rapid growth has resulted in “traffi c congestion so bad it 
threatens the region’s vitality” (Hart 2011, p. A:1). No defi nitive plan has 
been developed, but Georgia’s and Atlanta’s leaders want to ensure that 
the area can continue to grow. A proposed new sales tax could be one 
way to fund a “balanced” approach (roads and public transit), but “fi erce 
debate is under way over what that balance should be” (p. A:1).
Some leaders in the region are starting to recognize that, while “tax 
cuts may favorably tilt the cost-benefi t analysis of investors pondering 
whether to build a manufacturing plant in Georgia,” those benefi ts “may 
be quickly reduced if the end product is trucked through Atlanta, as plant 
owners incur the indirect, yet real cost of tractor-trailers slogging ineffi -
ciently across” the city (Atlanta Journal-Constitution 2010). The Atlanta 
metro area has been described as being a “region at odds with itself,” as 
it contains cities poaching fi rms from one another in the same zero-sum 
game that the Rust Belt faces. Leaders in the region do recognize the 
inconsistencies, as Atlanta residents hate the traffi c problems but also 
hate the idea of raising taxes to the level necessary to fi x those problems. 
The prospect of resolving these issues is complicated by a lack of coop-
eration among governments in the metro area, “which makes it more dif-
fi cult to create a thriving region and compete with our peer cities around 
the country and world” (Chapman 2011). 
Atlanta’s future hinges on its ability to solve not just its traffi c chal-
lenges, but also its water problem. The state of Georgia has been in 
protracted disputes with Tennessee, Florida, and Alabama for access to 
river waters, and the Atlanta area constantly fi ghts with south Georgia 
for waters within the state. Droughts in recent years have made access to 
water perhaps even more important than transit to Atlanta’s future, and 
this debate is more complicated because of rainfall, something no one 
can control.
why a company stays or leaves a particular location is based on “softer” 
issues like quality of life, which are even harder to measure than eco-
nomic growth, the subjectivity of the potential answers will bias study 
results. Some good fi rst steps will be to collect data, make sure the data 
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being collected can actually measure the outcome, and have that data 
collected and analyzed in a timely manner.
One of the basic themes of this book is that free trade in unfet-
tered markets and the production of things people value, rather than 
tax expenditures and other forms of government intervention into local 
economies, offer the greatest promise for economic prosperity. The 
tools that surface time and again in the tax expenditure literature are 
investments in physical and human capital. These topics could neces-
sitate entire chapters or books to cover their depth, but will be touched 
upon briefl y here to illustrate alternative approaches. 
Other Ways to Promote Industrial Development
Shifting the tax burden from businesses to residents often cre-
ates an environment that reduces the quality of services that are pro-
vided (Markusen and Nesse 2007). As has been mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, taxes and tax expenditures are only a small part of the 
decision-making process for fi rm location. The results of a higher tax 
rate or lower tax expenditures may actually be welcomed by companies 
because many of them place a high value on government services that 
benefi t the fi rms directly or indirectly (Bradbury, Kodrzycki, and Tan-
nenwald 1997; Wassmer 2007). For example, good school or university 
systems will provide quality workers to fi rms, and good transportation 
systems will allow for easier and cheaper shipping of goods to mar-
ket. In the case of Brooklyn-AG, Brooklyn’s infrastructure and schools 
were seen as insuffi cient (or even deteriorating), while Westlake’s were 
viewed as some of the best in the region (and improving). This disparity 
provided yet another reason why AG would want to move its headquar-
ters out of an area with inferior services to one with superior services.
Mathur (1999) provides evidence that investment in the develop-
ment and accumulation of human capital is a more productive and pru-
dent strategy to help support growth than are programs that focus on 
other aspects of developing an economy. An overreliance on simply 
luring companies based on tax rates or expenditures puts a region at risk 
in the long term; if a company locates somewhere simply because of the 
low rates, it is likely to jump ship as soon as another jurisdiction can 
offer a better rate. However, if a company has made a choice because of 
a region’s broader set of advantages, then small changes in a tax rate or 
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tax expenditures will be little noticed, given all of the other factors that 
brought the fi rm to its present location. As Mathur (1999) points out, 
“public policy that encourages human capital stock and R&D is in the 
long-term interest of a region, and the threat of interregional spillovers 
should not distract regional policy makers from initiatives that promote 
human capital stock of the region” (p. 214). 
Investing effectively in physical or human capital infrastructure 
requires actual outlays of funds, which is why the tax expenditure route 
is taken so frequently—it offers much less resistance and confl ict. Each 
city, county, or region has its own special needs, and there is no one-
size-fi ts-all approach available for economic development. But it is 
clear that investing in physical and human capital can be an alternative 
to tax expenditures that has a more predictable and lasting effect on the 
local economy. The mayor of Westlake, for one, does not want to be 
faulted for the investments his city has made in infrastructure. He states 
that “Westlake put a lot of money into its infrastructure and quality of 
life. . . . Why shouldn’t we reap the dividends on that investment?” 
(Miller 2011). In the case of AG, clearly Westlake is reaping the divi-
dends of its investment. Broadly speaking, one of the best things a city 
can do to ensure its future is to “take care of the basics, like infrastruc-
ture and education” (Talbot 2012, p. 74). This is particularly important 
when resources are idle during a recession, when building materials, 
capital, and labor are much cheaper, and will enable a city to prepare for 
its next industry or employer. 
CONCLUSION
The challenges that Rust Belt communities face are substantial. Let 
us reconsider the question raised at the start of this chapter: Why do 
some of these cities thrive, as others decline? Clearly, special attention 
should be paid to the lessons that can be learned from the use of tax 
expenditures in economic development programs. The fi scal stresses 
that the region faces are substantial and reinforce the problems. Much 
of the political rhetoric surrounding the demise of the area and the rise 
of the South and Southwest tends to focus only on taxes, essentially 
ignoring all other relocation factors. 
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At the same time one needs to consider that these southern states 
were also very far behind economically when compared to northern 
states, so some of the geographical southern shift can be attributed to 
the equalization of regions rather than an outright fl ight. This is, of 
course, no comfort to the residents of Flint, Michigan, who have lived 
through decades of economic struggle, or to those of Cleveland, which 
once had among the greatest concentrations of corporate headquarters 
in the country, and is now frequently seen as an also-ran. 
The problems facing Rust Belt communities are not isolated. Boom-
ing cities in the South, such as Atlanta, which were once the benefi cia-
ries of the southern shift, are now facing the same challenges: compa-
nies leaving for greener pastures. 
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